AMBASSADOR’S CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA, 17 SEPTEMBER 2004

Código Fecha Clasificación Origen
04BRASILIA2428 24 September 2004 Confidencial Embassy Brasilia

Buscar la fuente: [Wikileaks] [MRKVA] [Google]

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002428

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, BR, Bilateral Relations with the US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA, 17 SEPTEMBER 2004

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4
(B)(D).

(C) 1. In a friendly and animated initial courtesy call by
Ambassador on 17 September, President Lula da Silva’s Senior
Advisor on International Affairs, Marco Aurelio Garcia,
reviewed a range of bilateral and international issues.
Garcia observed that the bilateral relationship is positive
and sound, characterized by efforts on both sides at "mutual
understanding" and bolstered by the personal rapport between
Presidents Bush and Lula. Other high points of the
discussion follow:

REGIONAL ISSUES

2. (C) Garcia affirmed his own role in stressing to Lula the
centrality of South America to Brazil’s foreign policy
agenda. Specifically, Garcia said GOB priorities in South
America have included reinforcing Mercosul (which Garcia
claimed had languished under the previous administration),
building economic and political stability on the continent
(Brazil’s prominent presence in crisis management in
Venezuela and Bolivia are examples of this effort), and
strengthening relations with Chile. Garcia further said that
the GOB strategic toolbox for regional stabilization includes
use of BNDES development bank funding for infrastructure
projects, import substitution programs to increase Brazilian
purchases from neighboring countries, and expansion of the
investment presence in the region of major Brazilian
industries, notably Petrobras.

3. (C) The Ambassador asked for a readout of Lula’s recent
meeting in Manaus with Venezuelan President Chavez, and for
Garcia’s thoughts on the way forward in Venezuela in the wake
of the referendum. Garcia limited his response to the Manaus
meeting, noting that its central importance was in refocusing
attention on cooperation in the Amazon region, with new
emphasis on the Amazon Treaty Organization, which is being
re-energized and headquartered in Brasilia.

NONPROLIFERATION

4. (C) Ambassador raised the question of Brazilian adherence
to the IAEA Additional Protocol. He said that he believes
the dialogue on nuclear issues between the GOB and IAEA will
become "calmer" ("mais tranquilo") in coming months. Garcia
observed that Brazil’s constitution of 1988 expressly
prohibits national development of nuclear weapons; that
Brazil’s nuclear program is "totally transparent"; and that
Brazil’s regional and international non-proliferation
credentials are strong (Garcia cited the success of the
Brazil-Argentina ABACC mechanism for nuclear monitoring and
confidence measures).

5. (C) For those reasons, Garcia said the GOB believes Brazil
deserves patience as it works through its concerns toward
possible AP adherence, and he regretted media commentary that
sometimes casts Brazil in the same suspicious company as Iran
and North Korea. Ambassador replied that no serious analyst
would place Brazil in such a suspect category, but given the
continued intense concern about nuclear security, Brazil’s
hesitation on the AP question fuels conspiratorial
speculation among uninformed commentators.

BRAZIL’S DEVELOPMENT

6. (SBU) In conclusion Garcia opined that Brazil continues to
face several fundamental challenges on its road to real
development. These include: (1) stimulating substantial and
lasting growth of the economy; (2) encouraging much fairer
distribution of income; (3) diminishing Brazil’s
vulnerability to external economic shocks; (4) achieving
lasting macroeconomic stability, and (5) continuing to expand
and institutionalize democracy. Garcia opined that managing
all the challenges effectively will require decades of
competent and energetic governance.

7. (C) Comment: Garcia seemed to enjoy our conversation and
expressed interest in further contact. He was expansive and
thoughtful, his academic pedigree from years of teaching and
study in Brazilian and European universities much in
evidence. While Garcia’s intellectual influence on Lula’s
foreign policy likely remains strong, speculation earlier in
Lula’s administration that Garcia would dominate foreign
policy — even edging out FM Amorim — does not appear to us
borne out by events. While Garcia accompanies Lula on most
foreign trips, drafts the president’s international speeches
and has undertaken sensitive missions to Bolivia and
Venezuela, it is not at all apparent that his positions on
policy are decisive. Nonetheless, we intend to maintain this
channel to"the professor" (as he prefers to be called); his
access to and influence over a president who has also been
Garcia’s close friend for decades make such engagement
uniquely useful.

Danilovich