BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR’S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH GENERAL ARMANDO FELIX, BRAZILIAN MINISTER FOR INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY.

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07BRASILIA277 15 February 2007 Secreto Embassy Brasilia

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREL, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR’S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH
GENERAL ARMANDO FELIX, BRAZILIAN MINISTER FOR INSTITUTIONAL
SECURITY.

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).

1. (S) Summary. Ambassador hosted a dinner for Brazilian
Minister for Institutional Security, General Armando Felix on
January 30. Felix was accompanied by his newly appointed
deputy, Major General Ruben Peixoto Alexandre. Political
Counselor and Regional Affairs Officer were in attendance.
The Ambassador invited Felix to dinner to discuss the
upcoming visits to Brazil by senior USG officials, as well as
a number of bilateral liaison relationship topics.
Ambassador also asked for Felix’s views on closer Brazilian
ties to NATO. Felix was in a relaxed mood and frank in his
discussions, while Alexandre remained silent for most of the
evening. End Summary.

2. (S) The Ambassador had requested the dinner in order to
discuss the upcoming visit of the U.S. Attorney General and
to gauge Felix’s willingness to meet with the AG, and assist
in setting up a meeting with the Presidential Chief of Staff
for Brazilian President Lula, Dilma Rousseff. (Note: The
meetings did occur, per Felix’s commitment. End note.)The
likelihood of a late 2007 visit of the DCIA was also
discussed, and Felix repeated throughout the meeting that he
believed Brazil’s intelligence relationship with the USG was
extremely important to Brazil, and that continued
communication between the two respective intelligence
services was vital because of the ability to communicate
frankly and rapidly without the obstacles of protocol and
bureaucracy.

3. (S) Felix stated he was disappointed over the U.S.
Treasury unilateral designations of triborder area Hizballah
targets. For continued joint CT Operations in Brazil his
expectation is that the USG will treat the Brazilians as
equals and not take this type of unilateral action in the
future without first coordinating with the Brazilian
government.

4. (S) Ambassador noted a recent meeting between Brazilian
Foreign Minister Amorim and Dutch Foreign Minister Bot, in
which the Dutch Minister explained the benefits of
cooperative relations with NATO. Ambassador asked Felix —
as Lula’s security advisor and a senior military officer —
for his views on the issue.

5. (S) Felix appeared circumspect and said that Brazilians
must face the fact that "a price must be paid" to attain a
global leadership role. Brazil must be willing to modernize
and deploy its forces for international operations and
confront the prospect "of body bags returning to Brazil."
Felix said that he, both personally and as a military man,
believed the time had come for Brazil to pay the price and
assume a leadership position in world affairs. He opined
that closer cooperation with NATO would be received
positively as an issue for discussion with Brazil’s military
leaders, many of whom share Felix’s view.

6. (S) Regarding Venezuela, Bogota and Bolivia, General
Felix down played the rhetoric of Venezuelan President
Chavez, saying he had little influence on Brazilian internal
politics, and that as long as neighboring governments were
democratically elected, Brazil would try to be as
accommodating as possible to their particular political
idiosyncrasies. He commented that Chavez is receiving
primarily negative press in Brazil, and that only a small
percentage of political fringe groups might actually support
Chavez in Brazil. Felix also believed that Morales in
Bolivia poses little political threat to Brazilian interests,
but was concerned about Bolivian narcotrafficking and its
impact on crime in Brazil’s major cities. Felix stated that

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he was unaware of any FARC related risks to Brazil, but
committed to working with both the USG and Colombian to
support the democratically elected government of President
Uribe. This included working together against transnational
crime targets, including narcotrafficking, money laundering,
and arms trafficking.

7. (S) Felix also discussed the political versus
operational coordination of such collaboration. Felix gave
his approval for expanding cooperation, but did not make any
new commitments during the meeting. Felix expressed his
intention to keep the USG engaged with them over intelligence
and threat planning for the Pan American Games currently
scheduled for summer 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, stating that
preparations were progressing well.

8. (S) Comment. Felix was remarkably candid, causing some
visible surprise in his deputy. It will be interesting to
see whether Felix retains his position, and this frank
communication with us can go on.

Sobel