BRAZIL: BILATERAL ACCORDS A KEY COMPONENT IN COUNTERNARCOTICS APPROACH

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09BRASILIA757 16 June 2009 Confidencial Embassy Brasilia

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRASILIA 000757

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2019
TAGS: KCRM, NAR, PREL, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: BILATERAL ACCORDS A KEY COMPONENT IN
COUNTERNARCOTICS APPROACH

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Marie Damour, Reason 1.4
(b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: Brazil,s strategy for dealing with the
trafficking of illegal drugs has focused in part on creating
a robust diplomatic framework in recognition that the
"illegal traffic of narcotics represents a grave threat to
the health and well-being of populations as well as a problem
that affects their political, economic, social, and cultural
structures of Brazil and its bilateral partners." As a
result, Brazil has signed dozens of bilateral accords focused
on achieving more effective cooperation with both regional
partners and countries outside the region in the area of
countering the trafficking and consumption of illegal
narcotics. The agreements evince a flexible approach *-
varying lines of authority, use of either structured or
ad-hoc frameworks, etc -* and willingness to tackle the
broad spectrum of complex issues involved in combating
narcotrafficking and transnational crime that could be useful
if Washington decided to enhance bilateral or regional
cooperation with Brazil on these issues, although it is not
clear that the GOB would consider its existing bilateral
accords to be a sufficient basis for a similar bilateral
arrangement with the United States or for regional
cooperation with the United States in the areas where it has
agreed to work bilaterally. End summary.

2. (U) This cable analyzes a sample of 21 bilateral accords
signed by Brazil between 1988 and 2005 (see appendix for a
list of the accords). While Post focused primarily on
accords signed with countries within South America, we also
looked at a small cross section of non-contiguous countries
in different regions around the world to identify patterns
and compare approaches. A subsequent cable will seek to
evaluate the extent to which the provisions of these have
been put into effect.


Categorizing the accords


3. (U) Brazil has signed bilateral counternarcotics accords
with every country in the region. Of these, Post examined 17
Brazil signed between 1988 and 2005. In addition, Brazil has
signed numerous accords on counternarcotics with countries
outside the region. For purposes of this cable, Post looked
at accords Brazil signed with Lebanon, Mexico, Portugal, and
Spain, which represent a cross-section of countries from
North and Central America, Europe, and the Middle East with
which Brazil maintains good-to-excellent relations. (Note: A
list of the accords examined is at para 21. End note.)

4. (U) These accords can be divided broadly into three
categories areas:

— Cooperation accords to prevent use of and to combat
illegal drugs and psychotropic substances;
— Accords that have an explicit or implicit counternarcotics
component, but are not exclusively focused on them; and
— Accords to create permanent bilateral joint committees on
variety of topics, some of which have been created to
coordinate counternarcotics policies and actions.


Category 1: Counternarcotics accords


5. (U) In general, these accords tend to contain components
found throughout all agreements and almost invariably are
motivated by the parties, recognition that the "illegal
traffic of narcotics represents a grave threat to the health
and well-being of populations as well as a problem that

BRASILIA 00000757 002 OF 007

affects their political, economic, social, and cultural
structures of Brazil and its bilateral partners." The
accords with Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and
countries outside the region, such as Spain, Lebanon, and
Mexico share much of the same language. In the accords, the
parties generally are called to:

— Exchange police and judicial information about persons
involved in the production and trafficking of illegal
narcotics, as well as illicit activities tied drug
trafficking;
— Coordinate strategies for the prevention of use of illegal
drugs, for the rehabilitation of addicts, for the control of
precursor substances use to produce illegal narcotics, and
for the combat of drug trafficking.
— Establish technical and scientific cooperation to identify
and intensify measures to detect, control, and eradicate
plantations for the production of illegal drugs;
— Exchange information on legislation in the area of illegal
narcotics, psychotropic substances, and precursors and
chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs;
— Exchange information on imports and exports of precursor
chemicals that could be used in the production of illegal
drugs

6. (U) Other accords have additional levels of specificity.
For example, Brazil,s 1999 accord with Spain has provisions
for exchange of information on rehabilitation programs;
exchange of information on transportation, cargo, mail, and
other means used to transport illegal drugs, as well as on
routes; and exchange of personnel to improve information flow
and enhance expertise.

7. (U) In most cases, exchanges are to be led by each
country,s respective foreign relations ministry—in the case
of Brazil, the Ministry of External Relations
(Itamaraty)—and are conducted on an ad-hoc basis at the
request of either of the parties to the accord. In some
cases, implementation of the accords are to be carried out by
comistas, (see more below) and on a few occasions the
comistas, are to be presided by Itamaraty jointly with the
National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD), which is run of the
Office of the Presidency,s Cabinet for Institutional
Security (GSI).

8. (U) In the case of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay,
Brazil has signed amendments to the accords that provide for
cooperation between the parties specifically in border
regions. Under these amendments, both parties agree to
develop coordinated strategies for the prevention of illegal
drug use and for rehabilitation of drug users in cities along
their shared borders. Implementation of these amendments
tends to be delegated to SENAD.

9. (U) Some accords, but not all, have provisions requiring
information shared under the authority of the accord to be
kept confidential according to each country,s laws and to
only be used for the purposes outlined in the accord.


Category 1: Exceptions in the case of source countries


10. (U) Source countries, such as Bolivia and Colombia, tend
to break the pattern, and have more detailed agreements that
mandate each country,s main counternarcotics authority as
the principal go-between in the implementation of the
accords, instead of each country,s foreign ministry. This
deviation from the norm in the 1999 accords with both
Colombia and Bolivia is justified by the need for direct
communications between counterdrug authorities, instead of
through the foreign ministries, in order to make

BRASILIA 00000757 003.2 OF 007

&cooperation more efficient8. In the case of the Colombia
accord, implementation of the accord on the Brazilian side is
delegated to the Ministry of Justice and in the case of the
accord with Bolivia to both the Ministry of Justice and
SENAD. The accords with Colombia and Bolivia also include a
more extensive set of areas in which the two countries pledge
to work together. Both in the case of Colombia and Bolivia,
the countries pledge to share information on where precursors
are grown, to jointly establish lists of precursors and
chemicals substances, and to put into place a more extensive
and rigorous system of controls on the legal and illegal
movement of these precursors across their borders. Some of
these provisions include:

— Both parties will cooperate to ensure the control and
oversight of commercial, customs, and distribution operations
of precursors and chemical substances included in the list of
substances and will share information on operations suspected
of involvement in illegal use of such substances;
— Both parties will ensure that all import, export,
re-exportation, transit, and distribution of precursors will
have all relevant documentation;
— In the case of suspected illicit activity, both parties
will share information on the type of precursor or chemical
substance, name, address, telephone and fax, and clients of
the vendor of the substances; will share information on
routes vendors reported they will use; statistical data
related to the supply and demand of precursors and chemical
substances in each country;
— Requires the central authority in each country, upon being
provided with a request based on credible information from
the other party, to investigate either recipient of the
precursors or chemical substances;
— The central authority of one of the parties can request
from the other party information on the individuals or
organizations that carry out the sale, importation,
exportation, re-exportation, distribution, transportation or
storage in order to initiate investigations.


------
Category 2: Accords related to, but not exclusively
drug-focused


------

11. (U) Brazil has also signed more general accords that
impact Brazil,s ability to effectively counter the
trafficking of illegal drugs, although these are not
exclusively drug-focused.

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

12. (U) For example, a type of accord that Brazil has signed,
although infrequently, is police cooperation accords focused
on transnational criminal activity. In 2005, Brazil and
Colombia agreed to one, although it has yet to be ratified in
Brazil. The agreement recognizes the threats to regional
stability and security posed by drug and arms trafficking and
money laundering and the relevance of law enforcement
cooperation to maintain internal security and effectively
combat organized transnational criminal activity. The
agreement calls for cooperation in the following areas:

— Drug trafficking;
— Arms trafficking;
— Trafficking in persons;
— Child sexual exploitation;
— Environment crimes;
— Money laundering;
— Contraband;
— Counterfeiting
— Intellectual property
— Cybercrimes

BRASILIA 00000757 004 OF 007

13. (U) Under the accord, the parties agree to share
intelligence information related to the crimes outlined
above, share database information, and undertake joint
operations. In addition, the accord calls for cooperation
and &sharing of experiences8 in the area of public
security, particularly in the areas of community policing,
security at sporting events, protection of visiting
dignitaries, kidnapping prevention, public order, and
protection of civil and human rights, among others. The
agreement also calls for the creation of Bilateral Working
Group on Police Matters (GTBP) to be run on the Brazilian
side by the Ministry of Justice and the Brazilian Federal
Police (DPF) that will meet annually, or more frequently on
an extraordinary basis, and will develop a joint action plan
to implement the accord. Finally, the accord calls for the
police chiefs of the border areas to meet at least every two
months for the purpose of evaluating the progress of the
accord and making any necessary adjustments to its
implementation.

CONTROL OF AIRSPACE

14. (U) Brazil has signed accords related to the control and
combat the transit of aircraft involved in illicit activity
with several countries, including Argentina, Colombia,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. These types of accords generally call
for the combating of the transit of irregular aircraft
through the parties, territory, implementation of an
information exchange system, technical and operational
training, and regular evaluations of the efficiency of the
programs.


-
Category 3: Comista,, or joint permanent committee


-

15. (U) The third category of accords Brazil has signed
involve the establishment of joint permanent committees or
’comistas,. Brazil has signed agreements to create these
bodies with about 40 countries, including most, but not all,
South American countries, and with countries in every region
of the world, to include Canada, South Korea, China, Iran,
Egypt, France, India, Japan, Nigeria. Brazil has sometimes
signed accords to establish a single comista, focused on
multiple themes, with various subcomistas established to deal
with more specific subjects. For example, the Bolivian
comista, has a subcomittee on counternarcotics issues.
Brazil has also created single-issue comistas,. For
example, the counternarcotics accords Brazil signed with
Mexico, Paraguay, Spain, Venezuela, Peru all provide for the
creation of a comista, focused exclusively on
counternarcotics.

16. (U) These single-issue comistas, are generally
established to implement the bilateral counternarcotics
accords, and are empowered to come up with recommendations of
measures to implement the accords, as well as evaluate the
effectiveness of the measures undertaking by each country to
implement the accords. They are also, for the most part,
presided by the ministries of foreign relations of each
country and are supposed to meet at least once a year,
alternating hosting duties. They can also meet more
frequently on an extraordinary basis, but not without at
least two months notice. Some comistas, can also
establish &working groups8 and others can establish
&subcommittees8 that can meet more frequently and focus on
specific areas. The Brazil-Paraguayan comista,, uniquely,
can create either or both sub-mechanisms.

17. (U) There are exceptions to the rule that comistas,
are presided by the respective foreign ministries. The

BRASILIA 00000757 005 OF 007

Brazil-Mexico comista’, on the Brazilian side is hosted
jointly by Itamaraty with the Brazilian Federal Police; and
both the Brazil-Peru and Brazil-Spain comistas, are
presided on the Brazilian side by both Itamaraty and SENAD.


Comment:


18. (C) Itamaraty has a robust multi-layered diplomatic
framework that enables Brazil to work bilaterally with
countries both in the region and outside of it. Although it
is hard to gage how effective these accords are at enhancing
the effectiveness of counternarcotics cooperation, at a
minimum the accords serve to establish counternarcotics
cooperation as an important and priority goal for both
countries. As seen by the variations found within the
accords, Brazil also has shown that it is willing and capable
of maintaining a flexible approach that adapts itself to the
circumstances each country presents. Itamaraty has ceded the
leading role to other agencies in some cases, such as with
Bolivia and Colombia, and has shared the lead in others with
the Presidency through SENAD. Although the existence of such
arrangements could be exploited as a means of moving forward
with a bilateral accord, it is not clear why they were made
or that the GOB would consider them as the basis for a
similar bilateral arrangement with the United States.

19. (C) With regard to South American regional initiatives,
these bilateral accords suggest the scope of activities that
might be broadly acceptable within the region. However,
three notes of caution: first, it is important to note that
GOB officials are often unwilling to cooperate in broader
fora on matters that they consider to be of strictly
bilateral interest (e.g., border controls). Second, by
defining problems narrowly, policymakers often reject
potential areas for cooperation as not being of legitimate
interest to other countries. For example, Brazilian
policymakers tend to minimize the legitimacy of U.S. interest
in drug trafficking through Brazil by noting that the drugs
are destined for Europe and Africa. Third, senior GOB
officials tend to address drug trafficking in a reactive
manner, rather than with a goal of putting a halt to emerging
trends. They have rebuffed some proposals to cooperate in
targeting drug traffickers by dismissing the regionalization
of criminal gangs and questioning evidence suggesting the
spread of Mexican and Colombian drug cartels into other South
American countries.

20. (C) Finally, Itamaraty does not enter into agreements
with the United States without considering their broader
significance for the bilateral relationship, for Brazil,s
leadership in the region, and for Brazil,s global standing.
The GOB has been most willing to engage with us in areas that
appear to confirm Brazilian equality with the United States
(e.g., in trilateral cooperation), while resisting
cooperation with us in areas where the United States will be,
or will be seen to be, the dominant partner. Within that
framework, Brazil has been willing to cooperate with us in
global fora and in joint activities with extra-regional
developing countries, but has steadfastly resisted
cooperating with the United States within South America or in
South American regional fora. End comment.

21. (U) Begin appendix: Below is the list of bilateral
accords examined for this cable.

Argentina:
— 1993 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances(in effect in 1995);
— 2002 Accord on cooperation to combat the transit of

BRASILIA 00000757 006 OF 007

aircraft possible involved international illicit activity (in
effect in 2006)
— 2005 Exchange of notes to amendment to 1993 to establish
cooperation in the area of reducing demand for illegal drugs
in border cities (in effect in 2005)

Bolivia:
— 1988 exchange of notes to establish a joint permanent
committee to coordinate bilateral relations (in effect in
1988)
— 1999 Accord on cooperation to impede the illegal use of
precursors and chemical substances used in the production of
illegal drugs and psychotropic substances and psychotropic
substances (in effect in 2004)

Chile:
— 1990 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances (in effect in 1992)

Colombia:
— 1997 Accord on cooperation to impede the illegal use of
precursors and chemical substances used in the production of
illegal drugs and psychotropic substances and psychotropic
substances (in effect in 1999)
— 1997 Accord on cooperation to combat the transit of
aircraft possible involved international illicit activity (in
effect in 2006)
— 2005 Accord on Police Cooperation (not ratified)

Peru:
— 1999 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances (in effect in 2002)

Uruguay:
— 1991 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances (ratified in 1995)
— 2002 Exchange of notes to amendment to 1993 to establish
cooperation in the area of reducing demand for illegal drugs
in border cities
— 2002 Accord on cooperation to combat the transit of
aircraft possible involved international illicit activity
(ratified in 2008)

Venezuela:
— 1997 Accord on cooperation to prevent, control, and combat
the illegal consumption and trafficking of narcotics and
psychotropic substances (in effect in 1990)

Paraguay:
— 1988 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances(in effect in 1992);
— 2000 Accord on cooperation to combat the transit of
aircraft possible involved international illicit activity (in
effect in 2002)
— 2002 Exchange of notes to amendment to 1993 to establish
cooperation in the area of reducing demand for illegal drugs
in border cities (in effect in 2002)

Lebanon:
— 2003 Accord on cooperation to combat the production,
consumption and trafficking of illegal narcotics and
psychotropic substances and to combat money laundering and
other fraudulent financial transactions (not ratified)

Mexico:
— 1996 Accord on cooperation to combat narcotrafficking and
drug-dependency (ratified in 1997)

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Portugal:
— 1991 Accord on cooperation to prevent the use of and to
combat the illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic
substances (ratified in 1995)

Spain:
— 1999 Accord on the control of illicit trafficking and the
prevention of the consumption of narcotics and psychotropic
substances (ratified in 2004)

End appendix.

SOBEL