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04BRASILIA1291 27 May 2004 Confidencial Embassy Brasilia

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2009

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Virden, Reasons
1.4 (b)
& (d)

1. (C) Summary and Introduction: Annual U.S.-Brazil
Political-Military consultations, held in Brasilia, May 14,
reflected general accord on the health of the bilateral
pol-mil relationship but identified areas where collaboration
and coordination remained thin. USdel head P/M Assistant
Secretary Lincoln Bloomfield Jr. offered to help close the

gap on outstanding issues, particularly where specific
written agreement that would facilitate expanded cooperation
was lacking. While the A/S acknowledged that ties between
the two militaries were strong, such agreements, he said,
would enhance them more. Brazilian officials, led by Foreign
Ministry (MRE) Director General for North and Central America
and the Caribbean Ambassador Washington Pereira, welcomed
U.S. clarification on such matters as Article 98, a proposed
Defense Cooperation Agreement, GSOMIA, and ACSA, but conceded
little in bringing any negotiated agreement closer to
closure. Looking at the regional situation, the Brazilian
side highlighted bilateral efforts with Colombia, Venezuela
and Bolivia, but stopped short of implying a more active
political engagement with Colombia (unless specifically
requested from the GoC.) Focusing on its upcoming
peacekeeping mission to Haiti, the GOB asked that the USG
assist that country’s post-Aristide political leadership to
reach out to pro-Aristide elements and Caricom. Regarding
Brazil’s F-X jet fighter competition, A/S Bloomfield made an
indirect pitch for the Lockheed-Martin F-16 by noting
continued AMRAAM availability for the U.S. package. The F-X
decision process, according to the Ministry of Defense, now
rests with the Presidency. The GOB side expressed reluctance
for any significant change to the mission of regional
security instruments such as the InterAmerican Defense Board
and the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security. End Summary


2. (SBU) In order to achieve the unmet potential in the
current mil-mil relationship, A/S Bloomfield explained how a
defense cooperation framework agreement (DCA) would be a very
practical tool for facilitating cooperation in several
defense areas such as exchanges, training, and joint
exercises. He shared with the GOB a non-paper explaining the
purpose of a DCA as well as a SOFA, identifying the elements
contained in the latter. The U.S. side stated that a SOFA
was necessary for entry into a DCA. The A/S offered to send
USG experts to explain both types of agreements and, in so
doing, to clarify the differences between the two.
Ambassador Pereira was open to the possibility of a DCA but
remained skeptical that the Brazilian Congress would approve
a SOFA because of Constitutional concerns. However, he
acknowledged that since the SOFA applied only to discrete
groups of U.S. servicemen, the issue could still be left open
for internal GOB review. Ministry of Defense (MOD) Director
for International Affairs Air Force General Carlos Velloso
also welcomed the Assistant Secretary,s suggestion for
exploratory talks. Velloso noted that discussion of a SOFA
would go beyond the purview of just the Defense and Foreign
Affairs Ministries, and include the Ministry of Justice among
others; the A/S replied the same holds true for the U.S.
side, insofar as Brazil wants to discuss reciprocal


3. (SBU) General Velloso indicated that the Ministry of
Defense had already begun review of the draft General
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
facilitating the exchange of classified military information.
While the MOD wanted an agreement, Velloso stated that a
number of "restrictions and caveats" have been voiced within
the Ministry about "illegal" USG requirements (Note: Velloso
subsequently downplayed, then dismissed, the notion of
illegal requirements. End note). As a result, the review
process within the Ministry had ground to a halt. He
promised the MOD would continue to review the agreement to
see what is feasible. OSD Senior Country Director for Brazil
Luiz Sanchez replied that over 60 countries, including five
in the Western Hemisphere, had already signed GSOMIAs with
the U.S. In every case, no such "legal" concerns had been
voiced by the parties. Sanchez said the USG would appreciate
Brazil,s specific concerns. He also offered to arrange a
GSOMIA orientation visit to the U.S. as a confidence building
measure to alleviate MOD concerns, a proposal welcomed by the


4. (SBU) General Velloso recognized the importance of
signing an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
in support of Brazil’s upcoming PKO mission to Haiti.
However, he pointed to several legislative hurdles that had
to be addressed before Brazil could sign it. For example,
Brazilian Law 8666, he said, did not allow for "cross
servicing." According to Velloso, several passages within
the ACSA may need to be deleted or modified. Again, Sanchez
noted that 47 nations already have ACSAs in place, including
six in South America. Sanchez reiterated the rationale for
an ACSA and asked whether the MOD understood its routine,
non-binding nature. Again, the U.S. side requested Brazil,s
specific concerns and suggestions.

Article 98

5. (U) A/S Bloomfield explained that while there is
profound feeling behind the USG rhetoric, U.S. policy sought
neither to undermine the ICC/Rome Statute nor to be punitive.
Moreover, the USG, he pointed out, is not looking to harm its
military assistance programs, which serve our interests as
well. The American Servicemen’s Protection Act, however, was
a clear effort to use assistance as leverage to dissuade
countries from joining the Rome Statute, and the USG would
enforce the law. Noting that 89 Article 98 agreements had
already been concluded (over half with countries that have at
least signed the Rome Statute), Bloomfield said the USG is
comporting with the Rome Statute by following the Article 98
procedure. While the USG recognizes Brazil,s strong
advocacy for accountability and responsibility, the A/S made
clear we do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens. Moreover, he emphasized, the threat to U.S.
citizens of politicized prosecution has been shown to be a
real world phenomenon.

6. (C) MRE United Nations Division Deputy Chief Achiles
Zaluar responded that the MRE was gratified the Bush
administration wanted to avoid a confrontation over Article
98. The ICC, Zaluar noted, enjoys considerable public
support in Brazil, and the GoB believes the Court is an
important international institution. Brazil did not want to
give the impression international law automatically did not
apply to some countries. Moreover, Zaluar said, the U.S.
Article 98 model agreement appeared to exempt all U.S.
nationals and not just sent persons. "Things would be
different if we were talking only about USG officials and
soldiers," he pointed out, "but a blanket condition for all
U.S. citizens could be detrimental if (this policy was)
applied by all countries to the ICC." Brazil,s extradition
stance, he argued, was similar to the EU,s and the GoB could
offer "additional guarantees" if that would alleviate USG
concerns. He stated that Brazil would extradite to the
United States before the ICC and urged the USG in its
dealings with Brazil to think "out-of-the-box." Ambassador
Pereira proposed the GoB continue to study the issue with the
clarifications that the UGS provided.

Intelligence Sharing /"3 1" TBA Cooperation

7. (C) MRE Illicit Transitional Crime Division Chief Marcos
Pinta Gama shared USG optimism about bilateral intelligence
and law enforcement cooperation, pointing out that Brazilian
agencies benefit greatly from cooperation with counterpart
USG agencies. He cited extensive information exchange on
crime, drugs and anti-terrorism and specifically praised the
bilateral, Embassy-led Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG),
established in 2003. Pinta Gama did refer to a State
Department website citing "financial support" from the TBA
for terrorist groups and asked that such a determination be
"better established." He described the "3 1" mechanism as
instrumental in showing the reality in the TBA and the
challenges faced there. Pinta Gama also suggested that Chile
and Uruguay be added to the "3 1" Group. MRE’s crime chief
felt that additional bilateral cooperation and more fluid
threat information exchange could be achieved between
Brazilian civil aviation authorities and the TSA,
particularly in the absence of armed air marshals in Brazil.

Regional Challenges

8. (C) MRE South America Division Chief Rubem Barbosa
provided an overview of the state of Brazil,s neighbors, and
Pinta Gama reviewed Brazil,s border monitoring coordination
efforts with its Andean neighbors. Regarding Colombia, the
GoB remained concerned with possible spillover effects. To
improve tactical cooperation, Presidents Uribe and Lula
established a bilateral working group to exploit the
information gleaned from SIVAM, now completely operational.
Pinta Gama praised the work of the Regional Intelligence
Center in Tabatinga which monitors the flow of drugs along
the Colombian border. Brazil, Barbosa stated, perceived
significant political progress under Uribe and remained
"moderately optimistic" about that country’s prospects. He
reiterated Brazil,s offer to host a meeting between the UN
and the insurgents, if the GoC concurred. A/S Bloomfield
asked how Brazil could play an even more constructive role in
Colombia. Barbosa emphasized the GoB would not "impose its
views" on the Colombian people. Brazil would lend more
active participation, he said, if it were welcomed by the
Colombians themselves. Brazil wanted a clear signal or
indication for its broader involvement and would only act if
Bogota specifically requested its assistance.

9. (C) Brazil shares its longest and most porous border
with Bolivia. Ambassador Pereira said the GoB viewed with
"grave concern" the "seismic changes" occurring in Bolivia,
including the disturbing convergence of an energized
indigenous movement with the drug problem. Pereira
underscored the Brazil’s unshaken support for President Mesa
and President Lula,s efforts to keep Morales on a democratic
path. Brazil, he said, was also doing everything it could to
prevent Bolivia,s economic collapse and warned that
"moderation" had to continue. Barbosa explained that Brazil
continued to work with Venezuela on a wide range of issues
including trafficking-in-persons and cross border drug
trafficking. However, Venezuela must respect democratic
principles and move towards a democratic solution — a stance
the Lula administration continued to demand of Chavez.
Barbosa opined that Lula,s close ties with Chavez helps to
"moderate" the Venezuelan leader.


10. (C) Zaluar announced that the bill authorizing Brazil’s
participation in the Haiti peacekeeping operation had just
passed the Chamber of Deputies, adding that President Lula
personally had been involved in the process. (Note: The bill
passed the Senate on May 19. End note) Brazil, he explained,
wanted Haiti,s underlying social and development issues to
be addressed during this UN operation, and the international
community, and especially the U.S., should provide generous
financial support. The MRE believed that Haitians had turned
to drug trafficking only when there was no other viable
economic alternative after international assistance was cut
off. Pointing to continued repercussions from President
Aristide’s departure from power, Zaluar urged the U.S. to
press Haiti’s current leadership to reach out to Caricom and
the pro-Aristide forces. Caricom support, he felt, was vital
to a political solution and so far, the new leaders seemed
not to have a good understanding of the regional context of
the Haiti situation. A/S Bloomfield expressed USG
appreciation for Brazil’s decision to lead in this important
hemispheric operation, and the United States understood the
need for the country’s economic and social development. He
said he would carry the message regarding the behavior
towards pro-Aristide elements and Caricom back to Washington.

Defense Modernization Programs

11. (SBU) One of Brazil’s most important military
modernization efforts is the new generation F-X fighter
program. General Velloso indicated that the long-running F-X
competition process had progressed from the Air Force through
the MOD to the Presidency where a decision on the selection
of the F-X had not yet been made. The Ministry of Defense
remained closely engaged with the Presidency, the General
assured, and its technical imput on the fighter options was
being weighed carefully. A/S Bloomfield emphasized that the
USAF’s principal interest is not commercial but rather to
sustain a close, long-term relationship with the Brazilian
Air Force, which is held in high regard among the US
military. Regarding authorization to release the AMRAAM
missile as a part of the U.S. F-16 package, the USG had
confronted and overcome old attitudes in the U.S. Congress
because "the partnership with Brazil was a greater interest
even than our regional proliferation concerns." Amazon
Surveillance System (SIVAM) Commission Vice President Air
Force General Alvaro Pinheiro stated that with the opening of
the Manaus command center, SIVAM was "completely
operational." He cited continuing spare parts issues with
Raytheon, although he conceded there were no more "technical
problems." Southcom J-5 Brazil Desk Officer LTC Sam Prugh
indicated that the USG supported greater regional sharing of
radar data to develop a complete, seamless picture that would
better protect Brazil’s borders.

Special Conference on Hemispheric Security

12. (SBU) MRE OAS Division Chief Nelson Tabajara praised the
successful outcome of the Special Conference, including the
Declaration on Security in the Americas (DSA). He described
the DSA as evidence of the historical evolution of
hemispheric security issues within the OAS. To reach
consensus on such a significant document, a lengthy
preparatory process was indeed necessary. In Brazil,s
opinion, the DSA correctly emphasizes threats beyond simply
traditional territorial confrontations. Tabajara concluded
by asserting that the Declaration serves as both a guide and
a starting point because future work, including perhaps
additional conferences, will be needed to bolster hemispheric
security. Eli Sugarman from the Office of Regional and
Strategic Security, Bureau of Arms Control, echoed Brazil,s
position and emphasized the need to move forward with
implementation of the DSA. Sugarman also agreed that
continued consultations are needed to discuss concrete ways
to implement the more action oriented provisions of the DSA.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)


13. (SBU) Sugarman stated that one of the most significant
outcomes of the Special Conference on Security was the
creation of a permanent OAS "Forum for Confidence and
Security Building" to consider new measures and review
implementation of past ones. The U.S. hopes to use this
Forum to consider a "new generation" of CSBMs to address
emerging transnational threats of the 21st century. Tabajara
agreed that the pursuit of a new generation of non-military
measures is important. Since original measures have
succeeded in considerably lowering mistrust, he felt a new
generation of measures could continue this momentum and
further promote stability and military transparency in the

OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS),
General Assembly Resolutions

14. (C) Tabajara affirmed that Brazil was satisfied with
the work of the CHS, and he highlighted Brazil,s recent
draft resolution on combating extreme poverty as a security
concern for Brazil and others. Sugarman stressed the need
for a more effective CHS Chair next year to ensure that the
CHS is able to fulfill its numerous mandates, including those
related to Special Conference follow-up. The process of
introducing resolutions also ought to be reconsidered, he
added. For example, although the U.S. supports Brazil’s
resolution on extreme poverty, we were caught by surprise
when it was introduced at the last minute without prior
consultation. Sugarman,s reference to a U.S.-drafted
resolution on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
surprised the Brazilians because they were unaware that such
a draft resolution was being considered. Sugarman explained
that further consultations were needed before the draft would
be formally introduced. He concluded by suggesting a series
of regular (quarterly) consultations between the U.S. and
Brazilian OAS delegations to ensure better coordination on
hemispheric security issues.

Inter-American Defense Board Modernization

15. (SBU) The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), A/S
Bloomfield stated, should be part of a new array of effective
and relevant regional security institutions, and the U.S.
favors a range of proposals to modernize it. The U.S.
military, he noted, is increasingly called to perform
nontraditional tasks, such as providing advice to outgunned
police forces faced with heavily-armed organized crime
elements. Yet, the OAS lacked the expertise to assist in
large measure because it cannot call upon the IADB for help.
The USG recognizes, however, that making changes to the IADB
is a consensus matter for its members. Among the proposed
reforms, the A/S pointed to a proposal to divide the Board
into subunits for hemispheric security responsibilities and
for traditional defense.

16. (SBU) MRE OAS Division Chief Nelson Tabajara responded
that while the GoB also supports the IADB, it is skeptical
about the benefits of reforming the Board. While sympathetic
to USG concerns, the GoB, believes the IADB serves a unique
role in the region by providing a forum to discuss
traditional military tasks and its mission should not be
"diluted." New threats where there are no single paradigms
or solutions, should be accommodated through "new mechanisms
and assets...on a case by case basis" depending upon the
threat, Tabajara explained. The A/S acknowledged that the
two countries differ on their perceptions how to utilize the
IADB. MOD Vice-Admiral Murillo Barbosa acknowledged the
increase in non-traditional tasks undertaken by the Brazilian
military, including Amazon development, counterdrug
operations, and assistance to the Rio de Janeiro police.
However, he seconded Tabajara,s point about preserving the
IADB as a forum for defense issues focusing on "traditional"


17. (C) While the upcoming Haiti PKO was the principal
issue on the minds of Brazilian interlocutors during the
talks, within the Brazilian delegation there appeared to be a
disconnect between the PKO mission and the need for various
agreements, such as a GSOMIA and an ACSA, to be in place to
assure the mission’s effectiveness and success. We believe
our message may have sunk in. Subsequently, we have learned
that the MRE has approached various diplomatic missions in
Brasilia, inquiring about their governments’ respective
agreements with us. As Brazilian peacekeepers arrive in
Haiti, we may see movement on these agreements. Finally,
while the Brazilians no doubt came away with a better
understanding of issues of major importance to us, such as
Article 98, they conceded little except their stated
intention to continue reviewing these topics.

18. (U) Assistant Secretary Bloomfield has cleared this